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Revisiting Complaints Regarding Occupational 
Health and Safety: The Impact of Time 
and Economic Conditions
Konstantinos Z. Mekos, Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας
Ξαναβλέποντας τις καταγγελίες σχετικά με την υγεία 
και την ασφάλεια των εργαζομένων: H επίδραση 
του χρόνου και των οικονομικών συνθηκών
Κωνσταντίνος Ζ. Μέκος, University of Macedonia
ΠΕΡIΛΗΨΗ
Το άρθρο αυτό επανεξετάζει το ζήτημα των κα-
ταγγελιών σχετικά με την υγεία και την ασφάλεια 
των εργαζομένων στην περιοχή της Θεσσαλο-
νίκης, ζήτημα που είχε αρχικά εξεταστεί σε ένα 
άρθρο το 2009. Ο στόχος του παρόντος είναι να 
εξετάσει (α) την εγκυρότητα των συμπερασμάτων 
του παλαιότερου άρθρου, καθώς και την επί-
δραση του χρόνου σε αυτά και (β) την επίδραση 
των οικονομικών συνθηκών στις καταγγελίες που 
γίνονται και τις κυρώσεις που επιβάλλονται από 
την αρμόδια υπηρεσία. Το κύριο συμπέρασμα 
του άρθρου του 2009 εξακολουθεί να ισχύει: οι 
καταγγελίες δεν οδηγούν στην ανίχνευση των πιο 
επικίνδυνων εργασιακών χώρων και καμμία προ-
τεραιότητα δεν πρέπει να δίνεται στη διερεύνησή 
τους. Επιπλέον, όσο το κατά κεφαλήν εισόδημα 
μειώνεται ή όσο ο αριθμός των ανέργων αυξάνε-
ται, τόσο αυξάνεται η πιθανότητα οι καταγγελίες 
να χαρακτηρίζονται ως «άσχετες» με την υγεία 
και την ασφάλεια των εργαζομένων. Από την 
άλλη, οι οικονομικές συνθήκες δεν φαίνεται να 
έχουν κάποια επίδραση στην απόφαση της αρμό-
διας υπηρεσίας για την επιβολή κυρώσεων.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: Υγεία και ασφάλεια, επιθεώ-
ρηση εργασίας, καταγγελίες, μοντέλο logit 
ABSTRACT
This paper re-examines the matter of 
complaints regarding occupational health and 
safety in the area of Thessaloniki, originally 
dealt with in a 2009 paper. In this paper we 
examine (a) the validity of the conclusions 
derived in the 2009 paper as well as the 
effect of time on them and (b) the effect of 
the economic conditions on the complaints 
received and the penalties imposed by the 
office in charge. The main conclusions of the 
2009 paper are still valid: complaints do not 
lead to the detection of the most dangerous 
workplaces and no priority should be given 
to their investigation.  Furthermore, as the 
income per head declines or as the number of 
unemployed people rises, the complaints are 
more likely to be characterised as “irrelevant”. 
On the other hand, the economic conditions 
do not seem to have any effect on the decision 
of the office in charge to impose sanctions.
KEY WORDS: Health and safety, labour 
inspectorate, complaints, logit model
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1. Introduction
M ekos (2009) deals with the complaints regarding occupational health and safety in the area of Thessaloniki. It was an attempt to answer three questions: First, who are the complainers 
and which companies or activities do they complain about? Second, to what extent are complaints 
relevant to occupational health and safety? And third, do the complaints result to penalties 
imposed on companies? The answer given to the first question was that complaints do not relate 
to all economic sectors equally, nor do they originate equally from all kinds of sources. There is 
lack of complaints concerning agriculture or fishing, but there are a large number of complaints 
regarding manufacturing and an even bigger one regarding construction. This fact appeared 
related to the annoyance provoked by each activity: the agricultural activities take place in the 
country, while fishing is done in the sea, thus not upsetting anyone. On the contrary, buildings 
are usually constructed in residential areas; therefore, the neighbours are likely to be irritated. The 
complainer usually prefers to remain anonymous, while competitors seldom make complaints. 
The answer given to the second question was that complaints ‘‘irrelevant” to occupational 
health and safety are twice as many as the ‘‘relevant” ones. The complainers appeared unfamiliar 
to the competence of the Occupational Risk Prevention Centre (which is the office in charge) or 
they had a hidden agenda. If, for example, the complaint derives from an occupational union 
(union of people having the same occupation like stokers, drivers or forklift operators) or is aimed 
at a construction site, the probability for the complaint to have a direct relationship to health and 
safety matters is decreased: in the former case, the aim of the union is usually the employment 
of the union’s members and in the latter the complainer is usually a neighbour disturbed by the 
by-products of construction. 
Regarding the third question, it was found that in three quarters of the cases, the complaint 
does not lead to any kind of penalty and in one fifth of the cases in particular, the complaint is 
not followed by any action by the office in charge: this appears to be the rule in the occurrence 
of an ‘‘irrelevant” complaint. On the contrary, if the complaint is directly related to occupational 
health and safety, if it originates from a competitor or if it pertains to a construction site, 
the probability of imposing a penalty increases. The stronger effect in this model was derived 
from the variable construction. This may be justified by (a) the great number of fatal accidents 
occurring in the construction sector (European Social Statistics, 2002), (b) the existence in this 
sector of companies with different size and time horizon, that frequently change their place of 
activity, which does not facilitate the regular observation of their compliance and directs labour 
inspectors to use sanctions more often (Baldwin, 1995, and Hood et al, 2001) and (c) the use of 
the sanction of stoppage only in this sector (Mekos, 2006). 
All things considered, it seemed clear that complaints do not lead to the detection of the 
most dangerous workplaces and their investigation should not be given greater significance than 
to the other inspection activities. Three years later, the importance assigned by the government 
to the complaints has not lessened at all. On the contrary, a special call centre was devoted to the 
subject. The first question that arises concerns the validity of the conclusions derived in Mekos 
(2009) and the effect of time on them. The second question this paper seeks answers to, concerns 
the effect of the economic conditions on the complaints received and the penalties imposed by 
the office in charge. 
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2. Materials and methods
2.1 Data
This paper deals with the complaints regarding occupational health and safety in the area of 
Thessaloniki, that were received in a period of six years, from 2004 to 2009 (included): totally 403 
complaints were received and recorded by the Occupational Risk Prevention Centre – which is the 
office in charge – in that period. In the 2009 paper there were 148 complaints received during 
2004 and 2005. The investigation of the complaints was usually given priority over most of the 
other inspection activities during all those years.
The information recorded includes data relevant to the identity of the complainer (if available), 
to the company against which the complaint is made and to the content of the complaint, i.e. 
a brief description of the occupational hazards. It also includes the actions that followed it, if 
any. These actions could vary from an inspection followed by simple suggestions but without any 
sanctions, to a combination of fines and penal sanctions. Most of this information is expressed 
in a descriptive way and has to be transformed in dummy variables in order to be suitable for 
econometric modelling.
The data regarding the economic conditions (predictors regional GDP per head and 
unemployed) is taken from the Bank of Greece / Thessaloniki Branch “Bulletin of Regional 
Conjunctural Indicators for Macedonia-Thrace”.
2.2 Methods
Some sets of variables are cross-tabulated, in an attempt to detect possible relationships between 
them. STATA version 9.1 was used to carry out the analysis. Since all the possible dependent 
variables are categorical and in most of the cases they can only have two values, linear regression 
analysis cannot be used. A suitable probability distribution is the logistic and the appropriate 
model is logit. The probit model will also be estimated and compared to logit. 
A model having core as the dependent variable will be examined first, using as predictors 
all the variables that could explain when a complaint has an ‘‘irrelevant” or a ‘‘relevant” subject-
matter. The predictors in this model belong to three groups: the dummy variables relevant to the 
identity of the complainer (worker, local union, occupational union, neighbour and competitor) 
constitute the first group; the dummy variables relevant to the sector of the company against 
which the complaint is made (manufacturing, construction, commerce, services and government) 
form the second; the new variables regarding the economic conditions (regional GDP per head and 
unemployed) and age that shows the years that elapsed since year 2000, when most of the labour 
inspectors were appointed, belong to the third. 
However, even ‘‘irrelevant” complaints can lead to the detection of companies having 
hazardous working circumstances and, possibly, to penalties (Mekos, 2009). The effect of the 
predictors to sanctions will be examined employing another dependent variable, called penalty, 
which gets the value of one if any penalty was imposed on the company. The variable core becomes 
now a predictor.
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3. Results
3.1 Cross-tabulations
The first table presents the cross-tabulation of year by sector of activity, in an attempt to detect 
potential relationships between them. Pearson χ2 tests the hypothesis that row and column 
variables are independent (Hamilton, 2003). In the case of this table (Table 1), the independence 
hypothesis (H0) cannot be rejected: the association between year and sector of activity is not 
statistically significant.
Table 1: Cross-tabulation of year by sector of activity
Year Construction Manufacturing Commerce Services Government Totals
2004 33 19 11 9 2 74
2005 27 25 4 17 1 74
2006 25 18 11 13 6 73
2007 22 28 10 11 5 76
2008 18 14 8 15 6 61
2009 12 13 6 7 7 45
Totals 137 117 50 72 27 403
Pearson χ2(20) = 27.6693 Pr = 0.117
Three interesting facts emerge from Table 1: (a) the total number of complaints seems 
stable during the first four years and is declining during the last two, (b) most of the complaints 
concern construction sites or manufacturing companies, and (c) the number of complaints 
against government organizations, although small, is trending upwards over the years: such 
government organizations include social security agencies, the post office, the local airport and 
local authorities. The cross-tabulation (not shown) of year by government (a dummy variable) has a 
Pearson χ2(5) = 12.1548 (Pr = 0.033), which means that the association between year and govern-
ment is statistically significant.
In addition to the other variables - which can be seen as objective - a subjective one (called core) 
was constructed. The aim of core is to transform the content of the complaint (which is expressed 
in a descriptive way) to a value suitable for econometric modelling. The variable core assumes the 
value of ‘‘irrelevant” if the subject-matter of the complaint is not so much related to occupational 
health and safety, but rather to issues such as the employment of members of an occupational 
union or the nuisance of a neighbour near a construction site. The variable assumes the value of 
‘‘relevant” if the subject-matter is directly related to occupational health and safety (Mekos, 2009).
Table 2: Cross-tabulation of outcome by core (‘‘relevant” or ‘‘irrelevant” complaint)
Outcome Irrelevant Relevant Totals
No actions 64 7 71
Suggestions 101 88 189
Second inspection 44 32 76
Lodge complaint 3 0 3
Stoppage 16 6 22
Prosecution 7 8 15
Fines 13 11 24
Prosecution & fines 0 3 3
Totals 248 155 403
Pearson χ2(7) = 39.9967 Pr = 0.000
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Most of the complaints are classified as “irrelevant”: only 155 out of 403 complaints (or 38.46%) 
are classified as “relevant”. Of course, even ‘‘irrelevant” complaints can lead to the detection of 
companies with dangerous working conditions and to the imposition of sanctions. It is obvious, 
however, from the relevant table (Table 2), that the case of no action is related to the ‘‘irrelevant” 
complaints (Mekos, 2009). Pearson χ2 tests the hypothesis that row and column variables are 
independent (Hamilton, 2003). In the case of this table (Table 2), the independence hypothesis (H0) 
has to be rejected: the association between outcome and core is statistically significant.
3.2 Logit models
The results for the logit model having core as the dependent variable (2009 version) are displayed 
on Table 3. The overall χ2 test evaluates the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the model 
(except the constant term) equal zero (Hamilton, 2003). Since χ2(9) = 89.76, the probability of a 
greater χ2 with nine degrees of freedom is extremely low: the null hypothesis has to be rejected 
and, consequently, the model under investigation is statistically significant.
Table 3:Logit model with core as the dependent variable (2009 version)
Predictor 
variable Coefficient
Standard 
Error z P>|z|
Marginal 
Effects
Standard 
Error z P>|z|
Worker -.2707619 .3842596 -0.70 0.481 -.0579802 .07874 -0.74 0.462
Local union -.4495631 .3149534 -1.43 0.153 -.0944571 .06197 -1.52 0.127
Occupational 
union -3.105781 .7513776 -4.13 0.000 -.3741064 .03604 -10.38 0.000
Neighbour -1.612471 .5670094 -2.84 0.004 -.2713642 .06208 -4.37 0.000
Competitor -.032944 .7614028 -0.04 0.965 -.0073054 .16794 -0.04 0.965
Manufacturing -1.035298 .3813864 -2.71 0.007 -.2104646 .07005 -3.00 0.003
Construction -1.971286 .4029148 -4.89 0.000 -.3758077 .06418 -5.86 0.000
Services -.6771578 .4093949 -1.65 0.098 -.1384615 .07587 -1.83 0.068
Government -.1747665 .526998 -0.33 0.740 -.0379378 .11118 -0.34 0.733
Constant term 1.001587 .3385292 2.96 0.003 --- --- --- ---
Number of obs. = 403, LR χ2(9) = 89.76, Prob > χ2 = 0.0000, pseudo-R2 = 0.1671
Correctly classified complaints are 282 out of 403, or 69.98%
Four of the predictors (occupational union, neighbour, manufacturing and construction) 
have coefficients that are statistically significant, all having a negative sign. For example, if the 
complainer is an occupational union (union of people having the same occupation like stokers, 
drivers or forklift operators) or a neighbour, the probability of the complaint being “relevant” 
decreases. In other words, occupational unions and neighbours tend to make “irrelevant” 
complaints. The overall ‘‘correctly classified” complaints are 282 out of 403 (69.98%). In the 
same logit model but with fewer observations (totally 148 complaints, received during 2004 and 
2005), only two of the predictors (occupational union and construction) had coefficients that were 
statistically significant, and another one (manufacturing) was marginal (Mekos, 2009).
The next model (Table 4) uses two new predictors (regional GDP per head, expressed in euros, 
as well as unemployed), in an attempt to examine the effect the economic conditions have on 
the behaviour of the complainers. The second of these predictors (unemployed) is the number (in 
thousands) of unemployed people in the region. The model uses also a new predictor (age) that 
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shows the years that elapsed since year 2000, when most of the labour inspectors were appointed. 
The coefficient of age has a negative sign, which means that as the office in charge becomes 
“older”, the probability of a complaint being “irrelevant” rises. The coefficient of regional GDP 
per head has a positive sign, which means that as the personal income rises, the probability 
of a complaint being “relevant” rises too or, in other words, people with higher income don’t 
usually make “irrelevant” complaints. As expected, unemployment acts in the opposite way: the 
coefficient of unemployed has a negative sign, which means that as the number of unemployed 
people rises, so does the probability of a complaint being “irrelevant”.
Table 4: Logit model with core as the dependent variable (new version)
Predictor 
variable Coefficient
Standard 
Error z P>|z|
Marginal 
Effects
Standard 
Error z P>|z|
Age -.9797907 .3672941 -2.67 0.008 -.2173235 .08127 -2.67 0.007
Reg. GDP per 
head .0011685 .0004134 2.83 0.005 .0002592 .00009 2.84 0.005
Unemployed -.0417275 .022561 -1.85 0.064 -.0092554 .005 -1.85 0.064
Worker -.2327013 .3912157 -0.59 0.552 -.0498522 .08073 -0.62 0.537
Local union -.3756413 .3245751 -1.16 0.247 -.0793108 .06496 -1.22 0.222
Occupational 
union -3.12952 .754545 -4.15 0.000 -.3720507 .03596 -10.35 0.000
Neighbour -1.673453 .570592 -2.93 0.003 -.2760571 .06007 -4.60 0.000
Competitor .335916 .8348103 0.40 0.687 .0780323 .20136 0.39 0.698
Manufacturing -.7393408 .4682581 -1.58 0.114 -.1539527 .09091 -1.69 0.090
Construction -1.713817 .502493 -3.41 0.001 -.3327545 .08324 -4.00 0.000
Commerce .1755457 .5342227 0.33 0.742 .0397526 .12331 0.32 0.747
Services -.3789176 .4917543 -0.77 0.441 -.0802862 .0991 -0.81 0.418
Constant term -8.221236 4.008052 -2.05 0.040 --- --- --- ---
Number of obs. = 403, LR χ2(12) = 98.55, Prob > χ2 = 0.0000, pseudo-R2 = 0.1835
Correctly classified complaints are 291 out of 403, or 72.21%
Two of the three new predictors (age and regional GDP per head) have coefficients that 
are statistically significant and the third (unemployed) comes close. The two models, the older 
(reduced or “nested”) and the newer (“full” model) can be compared using the likelihood-ratio χ2 
(Greene, 2003 and Hamilton, 2003). Since χ2(3) = 8.79, the probability of a greater χ2 with three 
degrees of freedom is low enough (0.0322). Therefore, the null hypothesis that the 2009 model 
(reduced or “nested”) is sufficient should be rejected: the three new predictors should be used.
The results for the logit model having penalty as the dependent variable (2009 version), are 
displayed on Table 5. The overall χ2 test for this model leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis 
that all coefficients in the model (except the constant term) equal zero: χ2(9) = 66.80 and the 
probability of a greater χ2 with nine degrees of freedom is extremely low. Three of the predictors 
(core, competitor and construction) have coefficients that are statistically significant, all having a 
positive sign: if the complaint is ‘‘relevant”, if the complainer is a competitor or if the company 
against which the complaint is made is in the construction sector, the probability of imposing 
sanctions increases.
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Table 5: Logit model with penalty as the dependent variable (2009 version)
Predictor 
variable Coefficient
Standard 
Error z P>|z|
Marginal 
Effects
Standard 
Error z P>|z|
Core 1.424049 .3778269 3.77 0.000 .1683541 .05091 3.31 0.001
Worker -1.302003 1.081158 -1.20 0.228 -.0866621 .04291 -2.02 0.043
Local union .2400332 .5719528 0.42 0.675 .0256791 .06528 0.39 0.694
Occupational 
union .9751023 .6104595 1.60 0.110 .1308971 .10363 1.26 0.207
Neighbour .2119398 .413804 0.51 0.609 .0225354 .04657 0.48 0.628
Competitor 2.043441 .9273253 2.20 0.028 .375005 .22793 1.65 0.100
Manufacturing 1.056307 .6758587 1.56 0.118 .1244965 .08947 1.39 0.164
Construction 2.934711 .6808409 4.31 0.000 .4090513 .10456 3.91 0.000
Commerce -.0041915 .8667297 -0.00 0.996 -.0004189 .08653 -0.00 0.996
Constant term -4.085128 .6956838 -5.87 0.000 --- --- --- ---
Number of obs. = 376, LR χ2(9) = 66.80, Prob > χ2 = 0.0000, pseudo-R2 = 0.1947
Correctly classified complaints are 318 out of 376, or 84.57%
The results for using the probit regression instead of the logit (again having penalty as the 
dependent variable) are displayed on Table 6.
Table 6: Probit model with penalty as the dependent variable
Predictor variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z|
Marginal 
Effects
Standard 
Error z P>|z|
Core .7868559 .2095479 3.76 0.000 .1765086 .0509 3.47 0.001
Worker -.7735869 .5728004 -1.35 0.177 -.1023182 .04265 -2.40 0.016
Local union .1826039 .2936772 0.62 0.534 .039118 .06739 0.58 0.562
Occupational 
union .5313897 .3332571 1.59 0.111 .1326328 .09922 1.34 0.181
Neighbour .1034229 .2426432 0.43 0.670 .021478 .05256 0.41 0.683
Competitor 1.185995 .5241752 2.26 0.024 .3774047 .20651 1.83 0.068
Manufacturing .5368575 .325107 1.65 0.099 .1198019 .0788 1.52 0.128
Construction 1.591886 .3373648 4.72 0.000 .3937176 .08829 4.46 0.000
Commerce -.0613909 .4211019 -0.15 0.884 -.0118711 .07929 -0.15 0.881
Constant term -2.266912 .3401401 -6.66 0.000 --- --- --- ---
Number of obs. = 376, LR χ2(9) = 66.82, Prob > χ2 = 0.0000, pseudo-R2 = 0.1948
Correctly classified complaints are 318 out of 376, or 84.57%
Should someone look only at the coefficient estimates, the natural conclusion would then be 
that the logit and probit models produced different estimates. The comparison of the columns of 
marginal effects, however, reveals that the two models are very similar (Greene, 2003). Therefore, 
there seems to be no reason to substitute probit for the logit regression.
The three new predictors (age, regional GDP per head and unemployed) are used in the next 
model having penalty as the dependent variable (Table 7).
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Table 7: Logit model with penalty as the dependent variable (new version)
Predictor variable Coefficient Standard Error z P>|z|
Marginal 
Effects
Standard 
Error z P>|z|
Age .3245795 .4434475 0.73 0.464 .0322845 .04409 0.73 0.464
Reg. GDP per 
head -.0001657 .0004899 -0.34 0.735 -.0000165 .00005 -0.34 0.735
Unemployed .0407311 .0301265 1.35 0.176 .0040513 .00301 1.35 0.178
Core 1.408638 .3828351 3.68 0.000 .1653269 .05149 3.21 0.001
Worker -1.438832 1.111037 -1.30 0.195 -.091478 .03983 -2.30 0.022
Local union .1582557 .5748989 0.28 0.783 .0164517 .06238 0.26 0.792
Occupational 
union .9270449 .6205463 1.49 0.135 .1221351 .10254 1.19 0.234
Neighbour .1854394 .4208763 0.44 0.660 .0194536 .04642 0.42 0.675
Competitor 1.934011 .9451422 2.05 0.041 .3469789 .23081 1.50 0.133
Manufacturing 1.021973 .6766369 1.51 0.131 .1191398 .08841 1.35 0.178
Construction 2.872859 .6857835 4.19 0.000 .3968323 .10545 3.76 0.000
Commerce -.0182846 .8744168 -0.02 0.983 -.0018092 .08609 -0.02 0.983
Constant term -6.801578 4.831264 -1.41 0.159 --- --- --- ---
Number of obs. = 376, LR χ2(12) = 68.82, Prob > χ2 = 0.0000, pseudo-R2 = 0.2006
Correctly classified complaints are 318 out of 376, or 84.57%
The three new predictors (age, regional GDP per head and unemployed) have coefficients that 
are not statistically significant. The two models having penalty as the dependent variable can be 
compared using the likelihood-ratio χ2. Since χ2(3) = 2.02, the probability of a greater χ2 with three 
degrees of freedom is high enough (0.5689). Therefore, the null hypothesis that the 2009 model 
(reduced or “nested”) is sufficient cannot be rejected: the three new predictors should not be used. 
A new variable (election year) obtaining the value of 1 on the years (2004, 2007 and 2009), 
when general elections were held in Greece, was also tried (relevant table not shown). The purpose 
was to check whether elections distort the functioning of the office in charge. The answer is 
negative: the coefficient of election year is not statistically significant.
4. Discussion
B y enlarging the time span of the dataset from two to six years and the related enlargement of the complaint population from 148 to 403, the conclusions derived in Mekos (2009) are 
still valid. There is still lack of complaints concerning agriculture or fishing. On the other hand, 
there is a large number of complaints regarding manufacturing and an even larger one regarding 
construction (Table 1). Complaints ‘‘irrelevant” to occupational health and safety are no longer 
twice as many as the ‘‘relevant” ones, but yet 61.54% of the total (Table 2). If the complaint 
derives from an occupational union or is aimed at a construction site or a manufacturing company, 
the complaint is less likely to have a direct relationship to health and safety matters (Table 3). In 
83.37% of the cases (336 in 403 complaints) the complaint does not lead to any kind of penalty 
(Table 2). On the subject of sanctions imposed, if the complaint is directly related to occupational 
health and safety, if it derives from a competitor or if it regards a construction site, the probability 
of imposing a penalty increases (Tables 5 and 6). 
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However, as time goes by there seems to be an impact on the content of the complaints 
(Table 4). The coefficient of age (shows the years that elapsed since year 2000, when most of 
the labour inspectors were appointed), has a negative sign, which means that as the office in 
charge becomes “older”, the probability of a complaint being “irrelevant” rises. Perhaps, over the 
years more people are informed about the existence of an office that receives complaints (even 
anonymous ones) and therefore more people do submit complaints. In regard to services provided 
by the state or social organizations, supply and demand are not independent. On the contrary, 
supply and demand for such services increase or decrease concurrently. An increase in supply leads 
to an increase in demand, since some people appreciate that they can use a service that satisfies 
their needs or wishes (Spicker, 2004).
Regarding the effect of the economic conditions on the complaints received and the penalties 
imposed by the office in charge, a response is given by the results on Tables 4 and 7. As the income 
per head declines or as the number of unemployed people rises, complaints are more likely to 
be “irrelevant”. Poorer or unemployed people may want to get even with their ex-employer or 
the “society” or “the system” in general. Regarding penalties imposed, predictors regional GDP 
per head and unemployed have coefficients that are not statistically significant and, as explained 
above, the model including them should not be used: the economic conditions do not seem to 
have an impact on the decision of the office in charge to impose sanctions.
All things considered, the main conclusion of the 2009 paper is valid still. Complaints do 
not lead to the detection of the most dangerous workplaces and no priority should be given to 
their investigation. Unfortunately, politicians in charge of the Ministry of Labour seem to think 
otherwise or may have their own agenda.
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